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NOTE AND COMMENT
sumer from harm if possible. So too the courts have held the
vendor of food liable to the ultimate consumer for his negli-
gence and to his immediate purchaser for a breach of warran-
ty. Now the Montana court is extending the dealer's liability
on a warranty to those out of privity of contract; by a sale of
food unwholesome from any cause the dealer is made, as the
court says, "the insurer of the purity of the food products."
Surely the liability of the dealer who usually has little oppor-
tunity to inspect the food, especially packaged or canned food,
should not be so broad as that of the manufacturer who in
preparing the product had ample opportunity for inspection.
The principal justification for such broad liability of the deal-
er who is without fault is that he is in a better position to pass
the liability on to the party who should bear the loss." But as
Williston says, " . . . where personal injury is caused by the
defect in the warranted article to a third person, and the buyer
(here the dealer) is compelled to pay damages to the person
injured, it is disputed whether the buyer can recover these
damages from the seller.' " So long as such a doubt exists, the
better rule would seem to be to impose on the dealer a civil lia-
bility under the pure food act that is no broader than his crim-
inal liability.
James G. Besancon.
TORTS: PERFORMER OF GRATUITOUS SERVICES ON
PRIVATE PREMISES: INVITEE OR LICENSEE?
In McCulloch v. Horton,' plaintiff stopped in at the farm
home of defendant to pay for his board and was offered a ride
home, defendant stating that he was "going that way any-
way." While plaintiff held open the garage door at the re-
quest of defendant so that it wouldn't sway with the wind,
defendant backed his truck out swiftly and at an angle, so that
the side of the truck hit against the door frame, and the re-
sulting jar caused an upright wing on the truck to fall upon
plaintiff as the truck cleared the garage. Defendant knew
that the wing was then in an upright position and was un-
fastened. The court conceded that if plaintiff was only a li-
"Vold, Sales (1931) §146, pp. 454-5, and §149, pp. 466-7.
"2 WriLISTON SALES (2d ed. 1924) §614a, p. 1545.
(1936) 102 Mont. 135, 56 P. (2d) 1344. A comment by the writer on
the question of whether the Montana Court in the second appeal of
this case, (1937) 105 Mont. 531, 74 P. (2d) 1, adopted the doctrine of
comparative negligence appears in 1 MONT. L. REV. 97 (1940).
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censee, defendant's only duty was to refrain from wanton or
wilful acts which might occasion injury, but held that "plain-
tiff was an invitee, if not a gratuitous employee," and that,
therefore, defendant owed plaintiff the duty of exercising or-
dinary care, and that the lower court erred in granting a non-
suit against the plaintiff.
In Hatcher v. Cantrell' the facts were somewhat similar to
those found in the principal case. There the plaintiff, a neigh-
bor of defendant, went over to defendant's premises to sug-
gest moving defendant's car out of the garage to protect it
from a nearby fire. Plaintiff stood inside the garage giving
directions on how to start the car, and while so standing just
to the left of the driver, was injured when the driver started
the car suddenly while the front wheels were cramped to the
right. The court approached the question, as did the Montana
court, without regard to the theory of "active negligence,"
discussed infra, and held that it was a question for the jury
whether or not plaintiff was a volunteer. It would thus seem
that the Montana decision in the principal case is comparable,
for clearly plaintiff could not be considered a volunteer, as
he was expressly asked to hold open the garage door.
A preferable theory upon which to have tried and decided
the case would have been to ascertain whether there was a
failure to exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring plain-
tiff, after defendant knew of plaintiff's presence; know-
ing of plaintiff's presence, the duty to exercise such care fol-
lows regardless of plaintiff's technical status. Plaintiff's in-
juries were not due to a defective condition on the premises,
but were caused by the overt act of defendant in backing the
truck carelessly when it was foreseeable a jar might cause
the wing to fall. The causal connection surely is complete.! A
majority of courts and text-writers give lip service to the time-
worn formula that the only duty to licensees and trespassers
is to refrain from wanton or wilful acts which might occasion
2 (1933) 16 Tenn. App. 544, 65 S. W. (2d) 247. See also Smith v. Pick-
wick Stages System (1931) 113 Cal. App. 118, 297 P. 940; Ohm v. Mil-
ler (1928) 31 Ohio App. 446, 167 N. E. 482. Cf. Nevada Transfer &
Warehouse Co.'v. Peterson (1940)-Nev.-, 99 P. (2d) 633.
"We think it may be said to be the general rule, sustained by the great
weight of authority, that 'where the primary cause of an injury is a
pure accident, occasioned without fault of the injured party, if the
negligent act of the defendant is a cooperating or culminating cause of
the injury, or if the accident would not have resulted in the injury
excepting for the negligent act, the negligence is the proximate cause
of the injury, for which damages may be recovered.... .. Davis v.
Freisheimer (1923) 68 Mont. 322, 333, 219 P. 236, 240.
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injury,' but require a landowner to use reasonable care for the
safety of trespassers, licensees, and invitees, as far as his af-
firmative conduct is concerned, after he knows of their pres-
ence.' In Egan v. Montana Central Railway Co.' the court
said: "The defendants owed to the plaintiff as they did to
any other trespasser, the duty to refrain from any wilful or
wanton act occasioning injury, and the duty of exercising rea-
sonable care to avoid injuring him after becoming aware of his
presence on the right of way . . . " In many later Montana
cases, the court has failed to state the rule with this qualifica-
tion and has thus left it uncertain whether this exception to
the general rule will be applied in this state. It has been said
that this affirmative duty is based upon knowledge of the
presence of the trespasser as a man and not as a trespasser.'
In Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Nolton et ux,' defendant's em-
ployee negligently backed a truck against a car in which a
licensee was sitting. The court said: "There is no evidence
of willful or wanton negligence on the part of appellant's em-
ployee in backing the truck against respondent's car, but the
evidence sustains lack of due care on his part, resulting in
active negligence, for which appellant is liable. The great
weight of authority is to the effect that a person guilty of
active negligence, as distinguished from passive negligence, is
liable for resulting injury to a licensee . . ."
The Montana Guest Statute' limiting recovery unless the
injury is caused by grossly negligent and reckless operation
of a vehicle would seem inapplicable to the principal case,
'This phrase has been designated as a barbaric formula which has
survived the past, and the possible historical background has been
said to be the fact that the early judges In England were drawn from
the landowning classes and that for generations large tracts of land
were held by feudal lords having their own courts for the regulation
of disputes arising within their boundaries. Slowly the King's courts
assumed jurisdiction, but unless the offense was heinous, the King's
law stopped at the boundaries of these local dominions. If, however,
the landowner held open his land to strangers, the Kings court gave
protection, but some act of the owner by which the stranger was ad-
mitted was necessary. Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARv. L. REv.
735 (1937).
'Herold v. P. H. Mathews Paint House (1919) 39 Cal. App. 489, 179 P.
414; Palmer v. Gordon (1899) 173 Mass. 410, 53 N. E. 909; Herrick v.
Wixom (1899) 121 Mich. 384, 80 N. W. 117, on rehearing, 81 N. W.
333; Negligence, 45 C. J. p. 804; RESTATEMENT, TORTs, §§336, 341;
ANNOTATION: 49 A. L. R. 778.
'(1901) 24 Mont. 569, 573, 63 P. 831.
'RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §336, comment c.
(1937) -Nev.-, 71 P. (2d) 1051, 1054. See also Brigman v. Fiske-
Carter Const. Co. (1926) 192 N. C. 791, 136 S. E. 125, 49 A. L. R. 773.
'R. C. M. 1935, §1741.1.
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since the plaintiff was not at the time of his injuries riding in
the vehicle."
The inference that plaintiff under the facts of the prin-
cipal case is an invitee to whom the defendant would owe the
duty of prior inspection of the premises is doubtful, though
probably correct. It is going a little far to suggest that plain-
tiff was a gratuitous employee, however, since to establish the
relation of employer and employee, not only must there be a
contractual relation between the parties, but one party must
have the right of control over the other." It has been said that
there is a dearth of authority on the question of liability for
injury to a guest on private premises," although it has been
held that social guests expressly invited are only licensees, to
whom no duty of prior inspection is owed." The Montana
court in the principal case decided these cases were not con-
trolling because at the time of the injury plaintiff was per-
forming a service for the defendant. There seems to be a dis-
tinction, for in those cases the plaintiff at the time of the in-
jury was merely accepting the hospitality of the defendant,
and was not asked to go to a particular portion of the prem-
ises to aid defendant on a matter apparently to his interest
and benefit. Plaintiff's assistance was certainly of some ben-
efit, since it facilitated the work of getting the truck out of
the garage. Defendant was taking the truck out not merely
"Under a similar statute in Iowa containing the words "riding in said
motor vehicle" as'does the Montana statute, the Iowa court held that
before the statute applied the guest must be riding in the car. Puck-
ett v. Pailthorpe (1929) 207 Iowa 613, 223 N. W. 254. A similar de-
cision was reached in California under a statute where the words were
"and while so riding." Moreas v. Ferry (1933) 135 Cal. App. 202, 26
P. (2d) 886.
"Schmueser v. Copelin (1934) 99 Ind. App. 209, 192 N. E. 123; Ledoux
v. Joncas (1925) 163 Minn. 498, 204 N. W. 635; Hinds v. Department
of Labor and Industries of the State of Washington (1928) 150 Wash.
230, 272 P. 734, 62 A. L. R. 225; 18 R. C. L., Master d Servant, §3, p.
493 (contractual relation necessary). Pace v. Appanoose County
(1918) 184 Iowa 498, 168 N. W. 916; Khoury v. Edison Electric Illu-
minating Company (1928) 265 Mass. 236, 164 N. E. 77, 60 A. L. R.
1159; Security Union Ins. Co. v. McLeod (1931)-- Tex. Com. App.
-, 36 S. W. (2d) 449; 18 R. C. L., Master d Servant, §5, p. 495 (one
party must have the right of control over the other).
"ANNOTATION : 12 A. L. R. 987.
"Southcote v. Stanley (1856) 1 Hurlst. & N. 247, 156 Eng. Reprint 1195,
25 L. J. Exch. N. S. 339, 19 Eng. Rul. Cas. 60, 38 Eng. L. & Eq. Rep.
295; Comeau v. Comeau (1934) 285 Mass. 578, 189 N. E. 588, 92
A. L. R. 1002; Page v. Murphy (1935) 194 Minn. 607, 261 N. W. 443;
Morril v. Morril (1928) 104 N. J. L. 557, 142 A. 337, 60 A. L. R. 102;
Greenfield v. Miller (1921) 173 Wis. 184, 180 N. W. 834, 12 A. L. R.
982; RESTATxMmT, TORTS, §331; ANNOTATIONS: 12 A. L. R. 987, 92
A. L. R. 1005. The Montana court in the principal case indicated ap-
proval of the rule announced in these authorities.
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to take the plaintiff home, but on a matter of his own as well.
None of the cases or text-books attempt to say how much ben-
efit to the defendant is necessary to give one the status of an
invitee. It is frequently stated that "An invitation is inferred
where there is a common interest or mutual advantage, while a
license is implied where the object is the mere pleasure, con-
venience or benefit of the person enjoying the privilege. ' ' °
Another definition is that "A business visitor is a person who
is invited or permitted to enter or remain on land in the pos-
session of another for a purpose directly or indirectly con-
nected with business dealings between them.'" It might be
argued that plaintiff was an invitee coming by implied invi-
tation, since he came to pay his board bill." To retain this
status, after leaving the house, it would be necessary to show
that defendant asked plaintiff to go to the garage on a matter
of benefit to defendant, and any possible benefit or interest
other than social would appear to be shadowy until the time
plaintiff was asked to hold open the door."
Even though the status of invitee be extended to the sit-
uation where one performs some trifling service at the request
of the defendant, it must be remembered that the duties owed
to an invitee vary with the circumstances.
"One who enters a private residence even for pur-
poses connected with the owner's business, is entitled to
expect only such preparation as a reasonably prudent
householder makes for the reception of such visitors. On
the other hand, one entering a store, theatre, office build-
ing or hotel, is entitled to expect that his host will make far
greater preparations to secure the safety of his patrons
than a householder will make for his social or even his
business visitors. So too, one who goes on business to the
executive offices in a factory, is entitled to expect that the
possessor will exercise reasonable care to secure his visitor's
"Jonosky v. Northern Pac. By. Co. (1920) 57 Mont. 63, 187 P. 1014.
See also Chicas v. Foley Bros. Grocery Co. (1925) 73 Mont. 575, 236
P. 361 where It was said: " . . . A mere passive acquiescence by an
owner or occupier in a certain use of his land by others involves no
liability; but if he directly or by implication induces persons to enter
on and pass over his premises, he thereby assumes an obligation that
they are in a safe condition, suitable for such use, and for a breach of
this obligation he is liable in damages to a person injured thereby'."
"REsTATEMENT, ToRTS, §332.
"Vairo v. Vairo (1936)- Mo. App.- , 99 S. W. (2d) 113.
""Where a person has entered on the premises of another under invi-
tation, express or implied, he is bound by that invitation, and becomes
a bare licensee if he goes, for purposes of his own, to some part of the
premises other than that to which he was invited. . . " Negligence, 45
C. J. p. 794.
5
Beeler: Performer of Gratuitous Services on Private Premises
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1941
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
safety. If, however, on some particular occasion, he is in-
vited to go on business into the factory itself, he is not en-
titled to expect that special preparation will be made for
his safety, but is entitled to expect only such safety as he
would find in a properly conducted factory."
It could hardly be said to be a failure to exercise reason-
able care to fail to make an inspection of the premises in the
short interim before a licensee goes to the spot directed to aid
the defendant. In most cases it would seem that defendant
would be entitled to a directed verdict."
The difficulty encountered in attempting to classify per-
sons coming on the premises of another, as well as the difficul-
ty of adapting the traditional classifications to new situations,
as is illustrated by the case of firemen and others who come
by virtue of a public duty irrespective of the landowner 's con-
sent," suggest that the method is unsatisfactory and is apt to
lead to arbitrary results. The question, though, arises whether
anything better can be substituted. The present method has
been subjected to much criticism recently, and one suggestion
is that perhaps the matter could be handled by basing liability
on the standard announced by Brett, M. R., in Heaven v. Pen-
der,' that: "Whenever one person is by circumstances placed
'8REsTATEMENT, ToRTs, §343, comment e.
"In Leonard v. Enterprise Realty Co. (1920) 187 Ky. 578, 219 S. W.
1066, 10 A. L. R. 238, plaintiff went to defendant's apartment house
and was granted permission to inspect an apartment Just vacated by a
tenant. A portion of the premises being dark, he lit a match to see his
way, and as he did so an explosion took place. The court assumed
plaintiff was an invitee, but affirmed the lower court's action in di-
recting a verdict for the defendant, saying: "The negligent act giving
rise to the explosion was that of an intruder or of the man in charge
of removing the contents from the house . . . The landlord had no
knowledge of the condition in which the man had left the apartment,
nor did appellee, in the short space of time between 5 P. M. and 6:30
P. M., have an opportunity to discover it.. . .The unfortunate acci-
dent was from a cause that could not have reasonably been in the
contemplation of the parties or forseen by them.... Imposing liabil-
ity here would be equivalent to holding that it was the duty of a land-
lord to maintain almost a continuous inspection of his premises ... "
".. . A distinction suggests itself, however, between officers who go
upon property in the regular course of the business conducted there-
on-and whose presence may be deemed to be contemplated and known
to the owner or occupant-and those public officers who enter not un-
der any prearranged scheme but as the result of extraordinary and
unforseen circumstances. Officials of the former class may well be
deemed to come on the premises by invitation, whereas those of the
latter description properly may be considered no more than licensees.
The owner's knowledge of the presence of the former charges him
with a duty that cannot exist in the case of officers of the latter
sort... " 20 R. C. L., Negligence, §54, p. 62. See also ANNOTATIoN : 13
A. L. R. 637.
m(1883) 11 Q. P. D. RM9.
6
Montana Law Review, Vol. 2 [1941], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol2/iss1/3
NOTE AND COMMENT
in such a position with regard to another that every one of
ordinary sense who did think would at once recognize that
if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct
with regard to those circumstances, he would cause danger
of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises
to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger." Wheth-
er defendant's negligence is grounded in active misconduct
after discovery of plaintiff on the premises or is based on the
existing condition of the premises regardless of knowledge of
plaintiff's presence, it is believed that wider recognition of
this fundamental principle, rather than emphasis on plaintiff's
technical status, would result in fewer arbitrary decisions in
this important branch of the law.'
-Ira F. Beeler.
""The adoption of such a standard as that of Brett, M. R., would not
therefore make so radical a change in this branch of the law as is
sometimes supposed... If such a standard were adopted it would not-
carry with it the overthrow of all our law on this subject. Much of it
indeed could and should be retained. We should still have to con-
sider whether the visitor's presence was lawful or unlawful, known
or unknown, anticipated or unanticipated, whether he came on busi-
ness concerning the occupier or on a social visit, or in the discharge
of some public duty. The degree of care required of the possessor
may vary with each of these circumstances and where the law has al-
ready fixed the duty owing in one of these circumstances, and where
such duty is -generally recognized and accepted, it would undoubtedly
continue to be recognized even under a general formula. It is not
the idea of having different categories of liability that is mainly ob-
jected to. The writer's main objection is to the idea that placing a
person in a category is the chief purpose of the law, whereas in fact
that should only be a factor in the determination of the prime ques-
tion, viz: what from all viewpoints, ought to be done in this particular
case. Furthermore, the attempt to cover the whole field by a closed
and sealed group of 'categories takes no account of new situations
which may arise... If the duties attaching to a possessor in respect
of the various groups were to be occasionally revised, and extended
to meet changing conditions and demands, or if courts were free to
create new groups when occasion required, the system of classifying
visitors to premises into various groups could undoubtedly be made to
suffice." A. L. MacDonald, Invitees, 8 CAN. BAR REV. 344 (1930). Fur-
ther criticism of the classification of persons coming on land is con-
tained in 13 CALI. L. Rav. 72 (1924) ; Hudson, The Turntable (asea
in the Federal Courts, 36 HAsv. L. Rav. 826 (1923); Bohlen, The
Duty of a Landowner Toward Those Estering His Premises of Their
Own Right, 69 UNIV. PA. L. Rav. pp. 142 237, 340 (1921).
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